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Abstract: This paper presents a Monte Carlo approach for reliability assessment of distribution
systems with distributed generation using parallel computing. The calculations are carried out with
a royalty-free power flow simulator, OpenDSS (Open Distribution System Simulator). The procedure
has been implemented in an environment in which OpenDSS is driven from MATLAB. The test
system is an overhead distribution system represented by means of a three-phase model that includes
protective devices. The paper details the implemented procedure, which can be applied to systems
with or without distributed generation, includes an illustrative case study and summarizes the
results derived from the analysis of the test system during one year. The goal is to evaluate the
test system performance considering different scenarios with different level of system automation
and reconfiguration, and assess the impact that distributed photovoltaic generation can have on
that performance. Several reliability indices, including those related to the impact of distributed
generation, are obtained for every scenario.
Keywords: distributed generation; distribution system; Monte Carlo method; parallel computation;
photovoltaic generation; reliability; system reconfiguration
1. Introduction
It is widely accepted that distributed generation (DG) can have a positive impact on the
distribution system since it can support voltage, reduce losses, provide backup power, provide
ancillary services, or defer distribution system upgrade [1,2]. However, the connection of generation to
the distribution system can cause miscoordination of protection devices and, if not properly handled,
reduce reliability and power quality. Although distributed generation is often presented as a solution
for reliability improvement, the fact is that such assumption is not always accepted or supported,
see for instance [3].
Two main modes of DG connection can be distinguished: (1) DG operates as a backup source
within a microgrid; (2) DG operates in parallel with the distribution system. In the first case,
the generation units are locally operated and can be allowed to inject power to the system; if they are
correctly controlled, they can have a positive impact on distribution system reliability [4]. A generation
unit operating in parallel to the system can be forced to be disconnected in case of system fault, so the
benefit to the system reliability can be negative [3,4].
This paper presents an expanded version of a procedure for reliability of distribution systems
developed by the authors and presented in [5]. The new procedure aims at evaluating the reliability
of distribution systems with distributed generation using a Monte Carlo approach, assuming the
DG units are operating in parallel to the distribution system, and takes advantage of the computing
capabilities of a multicore environment.
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The software application used for this purpose is OpenDSS [6], a freely available tool that allows
users to represent the distribution system with a great accuracy and carry out the calculations over an
arbitrary time period using a variable time step size. OpenDSS can be used as either a stand-alone
executable program or as a COM-DLL (Component Object Model-Dynamic Linked Library) that can
be driven from some software platforms; e.g., MATLAB [6,7].
The reliability of distribution systems with distributed generation has already been analyzed in a
significant number of works; see, for instance [8–20]. A summary of the methods proposed until 2009
was presented in [21]. The approach detailed in this work uses a power flow simulator whose model
includes the protection system, see [5]. The system model assumes that there are no microgrids in the
distribution network, only photovoltaic (PV) generation is connected and an anti-islanding protection
is installed at the interconnection of all PV generators.
The application of a power flow simulator as OpenDSS in reliability studies has some advantages
since it can be used to illustrate how the presence of distributed generation can favorably impact the
performance of a distribution network after a fault.
Section 2 summarizes the main aspects of the Monte Carlo procedure and its implementation
in MATLAB/OpenDSS. The test system used in this paper is presented in Section 3. The modeling
guidelines and parameters required for reliability studies are discussed and provided in Section 4.
Section 5 details a case study whose main goal is to illustrate the way in which the approach proposed
in this paper is used to assess the reliability of the distribution system. The main results derived
from the reliability analysis of the test system are summarized in Section 6; that section also proposes
reliability indices to assess the impact of photovoltaic generation and discusses the circumstances
under which the connection of generation units to the distribution system can have a positive impact
in its reliability. The main characteristics of the multicore computing installation used in this work
were summarized in [5].
2. Procedure for Distribution Reliability Calculation
2.1. Description of the Procedure
The new procedure may be defined as a parallel Monte Carlo method aimed at estimating
reliability indices of distribution systems with DG. Input data include system parameters (i.e., network
topology, component parameters, including setting of protection devices) and yearly variation of load
and generation. Random variables to be generated during the application of the Monte Carlo method
implemented for this work are those related to failures rates, fault characterization (location, time
of occurrence, duration, type), and reconfiguration times. The main steps of the procedure may be
summarized as follows (see also [5]):
1. Run the test system during one year using time-based power flow simulation and a constant
time step (e.g., 1 h). This run, known in this work as base case, provides basic information
(e.g., energy values) that will be used for later calculations. Depending on the system under
study, the simulation can be carried out with or without distributed generation.
2. Estimate in advance all the random values related to the faults/failures to be simulated
(location/component, time of occurrence, duration, type) for one year.
3. Run the test system again but considering now the possibility of fault and/or equipment failure.
Regardless of the location, type and duration of the fault/failure, a protective device will always
operate. Reliability indices are updated once this sequence of events is finished.
4. Repeat the procedure from Step 2 as many times as required to obtain the information needed for
estimating reliability indices.
2.2. Implementation of the Procedure
The procedure summarized above has been implemented in MATLAB, which is used to calculate
the random variables and control the execution of power flow calculations performed by OpenDSS.
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Figure 1 shows a diagram with the connections between the different tools used for this work, as well
as the information to be inputted to and generated by each tool. Note that all the information required
to build and simulate the test system model is generated by means of custom-made applications when
OpenDSS capabilities cannot be used. For instance, the algorithms to obtain load and PV generation
curves have been implemented in MATLAB, and can be obtained at the time the reliability study is
carried out [22,23]. MATLAB also takes care of the simulation results that are needed to calculate
reliability indices.
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Figure 1. Block diagram of the implemented procedure.
To obtain a probability density function of the reliability indices the procedure is simultaneously
run in a multicore computing environment. The procedure schematized in Figure 1 is valid for any
number of cores. The system simulated in every core is the same but the number of faults and the
characteristics of each fault are different and randomly calculated for each core, see Section 5. MATLAB
capabilities can be used to distribute the different runs between cores [24,25]. This work is based on
the library developed by Buehren and available at the MathWorks web site [26].
3. Test System
Figure 2 depicts the diagram of the test system. It is a 60-Hz three-phase overhead distribution
system based on IEEE test feeders [27]. The figure shows the location of the protective devices and
transfer switches that can be used for system reconfiguration and restoration of power. The model
includes a simplified representation of the high-voltage system, the substation transformer and all
distribution medium voltage (MV)/low voltage (LV) transformers.
All loads are supplied from the LV terminals of distribution transformers. As indicated in the
figure, all line sections have switching devices at both terminals. These switches are used to isolate
the faulted section and, depending on the automation level in the test system, may be operated either
manually or remotely.
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Figure 2. Test system configuration.
The figure shows the zone classification, which is used to obtain fault isolation and repair times,
see Section 5. Some important numbers about the test system are given below:
‚ Rated voltage: 4.16 kV.
‚ Rated power of substation transformer: 10,000 kVA.
‚ Rated PV generation power (peak value): 1800 kW.
‚ Number of load n des: 107.
‚ Overall number of customers: 713.
‚ Average rated power per MV load node: 74.77 kVA.
‚ Overall line length: 52.1 km.
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4. Reliability Model
This section summarizes the guidelines followed to implement the distribution system model
and provides the parameters used for the reliability assessment of the test system.
4.1. Modelling Approach
The approach used to represent the system is basically that used in [5] but with distributed
generation units and their interconnection protection. In this work the generation is of renewable
nature (i.e., photovoltaic) and represented by means of the model available in OpenDSS, with some
additional features needed to obtain yearly generation curves. The algorithms implemented to
obtain load and generation curves were presented in some previous work by the authors; see [22,23].
By default, it is assumed that PV units only inject active power, and voltage at their terminals is
not controlled.
4.2. Parameters for Reliability Assessment
‚ Protective Devices: Figure 2 shows the type and location of the protective devices installed in
the test system. The characteristic time-current curves are similar to those used in [5]; they are
shown in Figure 3. The interconnection protection of each generator has over-/undervoltage
and overcurrent protection. If a generator is disconnected after a fault, it will be reconnected
when normal voltage values at the point of common coupling (PCC) are confirmed (>0.9 pu).
On the other hand, it is assumed that PV generators do not suffer any damage during a fault and
can be put back in operation as soon as possible. Table 1 provides some information about the
devices installed to protect feeders and the interconnection protection of PV plants. Take into
account that: (i) reclosers can perform up to three opening operations, two of which use the
faster characteristic; (ii) fuses are coordinated using a fuse saving scheme; (iii) sectionalizers
count up to two operations before performing an opening action. In all devices with automatic
reclosing capabilities, the assumed dead times are 10 and 20 seconds. Except the sectionalizer
model, which is a custom-made model, the models used to represent protective devices are those
available in OpenDSS.
‚ Failure Statistics: A fault/failure is fully defined by specifying the faulted component (line, voltage
regulator, or capacitor bank), the occurrence time, the duration, and the fault type. Table 2 shows
the statistics assumed for this study. Except for PV generators, the explanations about the way in
which this information is applied were given in [5]. The reliability model of a PV plant is rather
complex; see, for instance, [4,28–30]. Implementing and applying a very detailed model is out of
the scope of this study; instead a simplified reliability model is used. All PV generators consist of
one or more 100 kW modules, being each module characterized by the same failure rate and repair
time. Therefore, the parameters to be defined for reliability assessment of a PV generation unit are
the rated power (i.e., the number of 100 kW modules), the failure rate and the mean repair time.
A PV plant can totally reduce the power it injects into the system when either the interconnection
transformer or all modules fail; the reduction of injected power will be partial when not all PV
modules fail. The reliability parameters for the interconnection transformer are those used for
any other distribution transformer, while the parameters for characterizing the PV modules are
those shown in Table 2. The number of PV module failures in a year will be randomly generated
using the failure rate shown in Table 2 and following a Poisson distribution. For every failure the
number of failed modules must be determined using also a Poisson distribution. The average
repair time is the result of multiplying the number of failed modules by the mean repair time;
the actual repair time will be randomly calculated using an exponential distribution.
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Table 1. Main Characteristics of Protective Devices.
Devices for Feeder Protection
Protective Device Current (A)
TC Curve
Fast Slow
Relay.la01 1000 Fast2 —–
Relay.la90 640 Fast4 —–
Recloser.la48 440 Fast1 Slow1
Recloser.la121 370 Fast3 Slow3
Overcurrent protection regi 490 Regi —–
Overcurrent protection regd 39 Regd —–
Fuse.la49 4 Tlink —–
Fuse.la66 Klink —–
Fuse.la128 100 Tlink —–
Fuse.la159 140 Klink —–
Fuse.c1 30 Klink —–
Fuse.c2 50 Klink —–
Sectionalizer.la06 115 —– —–
Sectionalizer.la29 60 —– —–
Sectionalizer.la91 25 —– —–
Sectionalizer.la107 80 —– —–
Interconnection Protection of PV Plants
Protected Plant
Over/Undervoltage Protection Overcurrent Protection
Protective Device Rated Voltage (kV) Protective Device Pick-up Current (A)
Plant1 Relay.LV1 4.16 Relay.PV1 65
Plant2 Relay.LV2 4.16 Relay.PV2 110
Plant3 Relay.LV3 4.16 Relay.PV3 130
Plant4 Relay.LV4 4.16 Relay.PV4 65
Plant5 Relay.LV5 4.16 Relay.PV5 110
Plant6 Relay.LV6 4.16 Relay.PV6 130
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Table 2. Failure Statistics.
Time of Occurrence
Month and Hour Probability (%)
Month
January 4
February 5
March 8
April 7
May 8
June 8
July 11
August 15
September 13
October 9
November 7
December 5
Hour interval
1–6 30
7–12 20
13–18 30
19–24 20
Duration
Type Probability (%)
Momentary 75
Sustained 25
Type
Number of phases Probability (%)
One-phase—1 70
Two-Phase—2 25
Three-Phase—3 5
Lines
Zone
Failures
Average number (per 100 km) Standard deviation (per 100 km) Repair time (hours)
1 50 12 2
2 20 7.5 3
3 30 10 3
4 45 10 2.5
5 25 7.5 2.5
6 20 5 3
Distribution Transformers
Failures per year Repair time (hours)
0.100 10
Voltage Regulators
Failures per year Repair time (hours)
0.125 10
Capacitor Banks
Failures per year Repair time (hours)
0.250 4
PV Generation Modules
Module Size (kW) Failures per year Repair time (hours)
100 0.100 10
5. An Illustrative Case Study
5.1. Aim of the Case Study
The occurrence of a system fault or a component failure will cause a sequence of events that
may imply protective devices, isolation switches, a system reconfiguration when it is possible and
advisable, the repair of the failed component, and the recovery of the original system configuration.
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This case study is aimed at illustrating the sequences that can be produced after the occurrence of
a fault/failure, the calculations to be made, depending on the system response, as well as the results
that can be required for a later estimation of system reliability indices.
5.2. Characteristics of the Case Study
Assume that the characteristics of the case are according to the following information:
‚ Location: Line section LA93, between load nodes 791 and 793.
‚ Time of occurrence: 2750 h.
‚ Type of fault: Phase-to-phase (two-phase fault).
‚ Faulted phases: A and B.
‚ Duration: Sustained.
‚ Scenario: Disconnection and repair of the failed element with load transfer between feeders.
5.3. Sequence of Events
The sequence of events caused by this fault is presented in Figures 4–6:
‚ Figure 4 shows how the configuration of the system changes during the sequence of events caused
by the analyzed fault and the status of the various protective devices and switches/disconnectors
involved in this case. Remember that, once the fault occurs, the first steps in the sequence of
events are caused by the design and settings of the protection system, while the last steps will
depend on the performance of the maintenance crew.
‚ Figure 5 provides a sequence of events with the time of occurrence of each event. As mentioned
above, some of the values required to obtain this sequence are derived from the operation of the
protective devices and are of deterministic nature, while others due to the performance of the
maintenance crew are of random nature and generated according to the estimated probability
distributions, see Section 6.
‚ Figure 6 shows a diagram with the status (e.g., opened/closed) of the protective devices and
switches/disconnectors involved in this case.
5.4. Simulation Results
Figure 7 presents some results derived from the simulation of this case study. Note that, except
for the first one, the plots have their time scale in hours, and they compare the power curves that result
without the fault with those that are a consequence of the fault. The figures also incorporate some
information about the operation of protective devices and switching operations.
Figure 7a presents the power provided from the high-voltage (HV) system. Power value exhibits
a sudden increase when the fault occurs and remains approximately constant until circuit breaker
LA90 performs the first opening action. Interconnection protections (i.e., IP4, IP5, and IP6) trip due
to a low voltage condition at their PCCs; power values are not affected by this action since the entire
feeder was previously isolated by circuit breaker LA90. The remaining value corresponds to the loads
connected to the unfaulted feeder. Since the fault is still present after circuit breaker reclosing, a second
opening operation is forced. This operation causes the sectionalizer LA91 to reach its count limit
and open; as a consequence the circuit breaker will no longer sense any fault current. PV generators
will be reconnected to the system after a normal voltage value has been confirmed at their PCCs.
This action will cause a decrease in the power supplied from the HV system. Figure 7b presents
the power supplied by the HV system during the complete simulation process: after the protection
system has finished its operation sequence and the PV generators have been reconnected, a decrease
in power can be observed when compared to pre-fault values. This decrease is a consequence of the
loads disconnected by the operation of sectionalizer LA91. The procedure takes into account the time
needed for the maintenance crew to reach the faulted line, isolate it, and return the sectionalizer to its
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original closed position. This sequence allows restoring service to all loads located upstream from the
faulted line. The procedure also takes into account the time needed to perform load transfer when
it is possible. For the present case, service can be restored to all loads downstream from the faulted
line through the connection of a back-up feeder. Figure 7b shows how, after these two actions have
been completed, service is restored to all loads in the system. Switching actions aimed at returning
the system to its original state (i.e., reconnecting Line LA93 and disconnecting back-up feeder) are
performed simultaneously and their effect on the system is neglected.
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As mentioned above, the affected generators (i.e., PVplant4, PVplant5, and PVplant6) are
separated from the system by their interconnection protection due to low voltage at their PCCs.
Since no damage t the generators is assumed during the fault, they can be put back in operation as
soon as p ssible; therefor , all trippe generators are rec nn cted after confir ing n rmal voltage
valu s at their PCCs. For t e presen case, those PV ge erat rs ar located outside of the se tionalizer’s
prot ction area and can b rec nected after the operation of the protection system; as a consequence,
their downtime is v ry short, and the interruption can be considered momentary. Figure 7c presents
the actual PVplant4 generati n curve.
As a consequence of the sectionalizer operation, only loads SA792, SA794, and SA795 will suffer
a sustained interruption. Load SA792 is located upstream the fault location and its service can be
restored after isolating the faulted line and closing the sectionalizer; whereas loads SA794 and SA795
will remain without service until back-up feeder switch FA01 is connected. Figure 7d shows the power
supplied to loads SA792 and SA794.
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6. Studies and Results
This section details the different scenarios proposed in this paper for reliability analysis, presents
the load- and generation-related reliability indices that will be calculated, and discusses the main
simulation results. The positive impact that distributed generation (namely, PV generation) can have
under some operating conditions is also discussed.
6.1. Reliability Studies
Three different scenarios have been considered to calculate reliability indices with and without
distributed generation [5]:
1. Only protective devices operate; that is, a protection device locks out after a permanent fault,
and service is not restored before the faulted component is repaired.
2. Switching operations aimed at isolating the faulted section are performed; this may restore service
only to load nodes upstream the failed component.
3. System reconfiguration may be used by means of transfer switches between feeders to restore
service to some load nodes downstream the faulted section, depending on the system design.
The calculations are carried out with a time step of 1 h, but it is reduced when the fault/failure
occurs since a shorter time step is required by protective device models in case of system fault. For more
details about the time step size used in each interval from the moment at which the fault occurs until
the moment at which the normal operation of the system is restored see [5].
According to IEEE Std 1366-2012 there exist a distinction between momentary and sustained
interruptions [31]. On the other hand, faults/failures may be classified as temporary or permanent.
Although temporary distribution faults rarely exceed 5 min, depending on the grounding system
design, it is possible to find longer temporary faults; therefore, momentary interruption (i.e., less than
5 min) should not be always seen as equivalent of temporary fault/failure (i.e., more than 5 min).
A failure in an overhead line may be temporary or permanent, while a failure in any other component
will be by default permanent. Finally, all faults are assumed by default bolted.
6.2. Some Remarks
‚ Network reconfiguration and surplus in PV generation can cause reverse power flow through
voltage regulators. Reverse power flow can interfere with voltage regulator control and cause
unacceptable operating conditions; therefore, voltage regulator control will be disabled during
reverse power flow.
‚ A fault in a line section close to the substation will cause a voltage dip at the nodes of the adjacent
feeder, and this could cause the operation of the undervoltage protection of PV generators.
Protective devices have been coordinated to avoid these consequences; that is, the overcurrent
relay installed to protect the faulted feeder will be faster that the undervoltage protection of PV
generators connected to the adjacent feeder.
‚ Load transfer will be carried out only when normal operating conditions are ensured. That is,
when load transfer is considered, the procedure will be as follows: (1) check for availability of
back-up feeder; (2) if there is an available back-up feeder, load is transferred; (3) during the
simulation, voltages at load points and phase currents through lines and voltage regulators are
monitored; (4) when the simulation is finished, the procedure checks for the technical restrictions
(all load point voltages are above 0.9 pu; phase current through distribution lines and voltage
regulators do not exceed 110% of nominal rating); (5) if one of the previous restrictions is not
satisfied the procedure will deem the operation not successful and repeat the simulation without
considering load transfer.
‚ Some special situations have to be considered; one of these situations can occur when load
transfer is possible and two maintenance crews are involved: one will take care of the repair and
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associated operations (e.g., isolation of the failed component), the other one will take care of the
transfer maneuver. Both actions are considered independent from each other, and the moments at
which the repair of the failed component will finish and the transfer maneuver will be made are
randomly estimated. As a consequence of these calculations, the transfer maneuver should be
made prior to the moment at which the other crew would finish the repair; if the time interval
between the two moments is shorter than 15 min then the transfer operation is not carried out to
avoid that an additional maneuver had to be made short after the failed component was repaired.
‚ A different situation can occur with the previous scenario if some remote control and small
values are assumed for some switching times. Remember that back-up feeder connection time is
randomly generated and follows an exponential distribution. Two cases have been considered:
- Back-up feeder connection time is shorter than the time needed to disconnect the failed
element and close the operated protective device: in this case the procedure will perform
both actions simultaneously, using the longer time for both actions.
- Back-up feeder connection time is longer than the time needed to disconnect the failed
element and close the operated protective device: for this condition the procedure will
perform both actions independently at their specified times.
‚ If a one-phase fault occurs on a distribution line protected by a fuse, two cases can be considered:
- Phase voltages at LV load points are above 0.9 pu: the repair will be carried out in a normal
manner; loads will not experience any interruption.
- Phase voltages at LV load points are below 0.9 pu: the healthy phases will then be opened,
isolating all elements downstream from the operated fuse.
If a two-phase fault occurs on a distribution line protected by a fuse, the remaining phase must be
opened to disconnect all voltage sources from the failed zone.
6.3. Reliability Indices
To assess the impact of DG on the distribution system reliability, the calculations presented in this
paper compare the indices that result from the three scenarios with and without generation; however,
for a better assessment the indices when PV generation units are connected to the test system have
also been calculated assuming that the generation equipment (i.e., PV modules and interconnection
transformers) never fails.
In addition to the classical distribution reliability indices [31], the following two additional indices
related to power generation, and named according to [12], have been estimated:
‚ System Average Interruption Frequency Index for DG (SAIFIDG):
SAIFIDG “
kř
i“1
PGi
PGT
(1)
‚ System Average Interruption Duration Index for DG (SAIDIDG):
SAIDIDG “
kř
i“1
PGi ¨ Hi
PGT
(2)
where k is the number of sustained interruptions in the distribution system corresponding to a
given year, PGi is the number of rated kWs of PV generation disconnected from the system during
an interruption in the system, PGT is the total rated generation, measured in kW, and Hi is the
duration of the disconnection for the PV generation affected by the interruption.
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The index SAIFIDG is the average number of interruptions that each kW of rated generation
experiences, while the index SAIDIDG is the average outage duration for each kW of rated generation.
A third index is the Actual Energy Not Produced (AENP). It is the difference between the actual
energy produced when the system is simulated without any fault (i.e., base case) and that resulting
when faults can occur.
6.4. Simulation Results
The calculation of probability density functions of reliability indices is made using a distributed
computing environment with 60 cores, see Figure 1. The stopping criterion used for assessing convergence
is the coefficient of variation (CV) [5], which helps to determine if enough executions have been performed
in order to estimate the probability density function (PDF) of a variable. In this paper, it is assumed that
the Monte Carlo method has converged when the CV of all calculated indices is below 5%.
Table 3 shows the values obtained for some reliability indices derived after 360 and 420 runs,
and considering only Scenario 3 (see Section 6.1). According to the results provided in Table 3, 360 runs
are enough to estimate load-related reliability indices with enough accuracy. However, the CV value
after 360 runs is more than 5% for those indices related to generation; the main reason is the low number
of generation units that are affected by a fault. Reliability indices are calculated as recommended by
IEEE Std 1366 [31] or according to the above expressions. The acronym AENS stands for Actual Energy
Not Supplied, and was introduced in [5].
Table 3. Reliability Indices—Sensitivity Study.
Index
Without DG With DG(DG Equipment Does Not Fail)
With DG
(DG Equipment Can Fail)
360 runs 360 runs 420 runs 360 runs 420 runs
SAIFI (int)
Mean 1.203 1.203 1.1723 1.197 1.163
Deviation 0.612 0.612 0.654 0.607 0.613
CV (%) 2.680 2.6796 2.720 2.672 2.569
SAIDI (h/year)
Mean 2.703 2.641 2.596 2.676 2.587
Deviation 1.375 1.285 1.280 1.426 1.373
CV (%) 2.681 2.564 2.406 2.809 2.590
CAIDI * (h/int)
Mean 2.683 2.638 2.809 2.699 2.628
Deviation 1.711 1.696 1.896 1.819 1.537
CV (%) 3.362 3.388 3.293 3.553 2.854
AENS (kWh/year)
Mean 8592.6 8365.6 8266.3 8565.6 8186.9
Deviation 4730.4 4354.3 4475.9 4976.6 4668.5
CV (%) 2.901 2.743 2.642 3.062 2.782
SAIFIDG (int)
Mean 1.108 1.078 1.361 1.327
Deviation —– 0.658 0.697 0.696 0.684
CV (%) 3.130 3.157 2.695 2.515
SAIDIDG (h/year)
Mean 1.659 1.634 6.212 6.057
Deviation —– 1.500 1.571 5.984 5.240
CV (%) 4.763 4.692 5.077 4.221
AENP (kWh/year)
Mean 489.4 486.3 1837.3 1883.8
Deviation —– 593.2 613.5 2092.3 1908.7
CV (%) 6.389 6.155 6.002 4.944
* CAIDI stands for Customer Average Interruption Duration Index [31].
Table 4 shows the results obtained for the three scenarios. Given the results presented in Table 3,
the number of runs considered without and with DG has been 420. Table 4 presents a summary of
the probability distributions of these indices. Table 5 provides the computing time that was needed
for the options considered with Scenario 3, which is the most sophisticated one and for which the
longest simulation times are required. The probability density functions for some reliability indices are
shown in Figure 8.
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Load Indices: The restrictions upon the formation of islands causes load indices to present similar
probability distributions with and without PV generation. Note that the SAIFI (System Average
Interruption Frequency Index) index, which depends only on failure rates, is very similar in all studies.
The differences are basically due to single-phase faults: when a single-phase fault provokes a fuse
operation, affected loads may suffer a voltage drop instead of an interruption. Scenario 1 presents
higher values for this index: as previously explained, every time a one-phase fault occurs, the system
checks the minimum voltage at load terminals; if the minimum voltage is below 0.9 pu, the procedure
will open the remaining phases, causing an interruption to all loads downstream from the operated
fuse. Finally, Scenario 2 presents values slightly higher than Scenario 3 but lower than Scenario 1;
single-phase faults protected by fuses are again responsible for this behaviour. As in Scenario 1,
the procedure checks the minimum voltage at load terminals; if the minimum voltage is below 0.9 pu,
then the failed line will be isolated and the operated fuse replaced. Under these circumstances only load
downstream from the failed line will suffer a sustained interruption. If load transfer through a back-up
feeder is possible (i.e., Scenario 3) and the connection time is lower than the time required to isolate
the failed line and replace the operated fuse, the procedure will perform both actions simultaneously;
as a consequence loads located downstream from the failed line will not experience any sustained
interruption. The differences between SAIDI (System Average Interruption Duration Index) values
for Scenarios 1 and 2 are clear: the possibility of isolating the failed element and closing the operated
protection device reduces the interruption time experienced by loads upstream from the failed element,
having this decrease an impact on the global SAIDI value. Moreover, the possibility of load transfer,
which allows quickly restoring service to those loads located downstream from the failed element,
will further reduce the index. As for AENS, the conclusions are similar to those drawn for SAIDI.
Table 4. Probability Distributions of Reliability Indices—420 runs.
Scenario Index
Without DG With DG(DG Equipment Does Not Fail)
With DG
(DG Equipment Can Fail)
Mean Deviation Mean Deviation Mean Deviation
1—Service is restored
to affected customers
after repair
SAIFI (int) 1.205 0.652 1.205 0.652 1.200 0.612
SAIDI (h/year) 5.522 3.170 5.522 3.170 5.689 3.302
CAIDI (h/int) 5.074 2.307 5.074 2.307 5.007 2.189
AENS (kWh/year) 17529.2 10179.6 17529.1 10179.6 17887.7 10456.7
SAIFIDG (int) —– —– 1.078 0.697 1.327 0.684
SAIDIDG (h/year) —– —– 4.640 3.946 9.325 6.246
AENP (kWh/year) —– —– 1464.1 1713.7 2971.9 2620.4
2—Service is restored
to some customers
after switching
SAIFI (int) 1.176 0.654 1.176 0.654 1.167 0.613
SAIDI (h/year) 3.778 2.396 3.778 2.396 3.936 2.569
CAIDI (h/int) 3.809 2.441 3.809 2.441 3.741 2.216
AENS (kWh/year) 11698.2 7232.8 11698.2 7232.8 12122.0 7722.2
SAIFIDG (int) —– —– 1.078 0.697 1.327 0.684
SAIDIDG (h/year) —– —– 3.256 3.319 7.900 5.862
AENP (kWh/year) —– —– 1043.2 1375.4 2486.9 2310.8
3—Service is restored
to some customers
after reconfiguration
SAIFI (int) 1.173 0.654 1.173 0.654 1.163 0.613
SAIDI (h/year) 2.654 1.316 2.596 1.280 2.587 1.373
CAIDI (h/int) 2.861 1.909 2.809 1.896 2.628 1.537
AENS (kWh/year) 8475.2 4631.5 8266.3 4475.9 8187.0 4668.5
SAIFIDG (int) —– —– 1.078 0.697 1.327 0.684
SAIDIDG (h/year) —– —– 1.634 1.571 6.057 5.240
AENP (kWh/year) —– —– 486.3 613.5 1883.8 1908.7
DG Indices: The results provided in Table 4 show that SAIFIDG values are the same for all
3 scenarios, while SAIDIDG values depend on the level of automation (i.e., the scenario under study).
These results are reasonable since all protective devices between PV generators and the substation
transformer are three-phase and the number of interruptions does not depend on the automation
incorporated to the system. However, the SAIDIDG reduction is lower when compared to load indices
because the failure of DG equipment is independent from network automation level and normal
operation can only be resumed after all repairs have been finished. As for AENP, its variation is similar
to that obtained for SAIDIDG.
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6.5. Simulation Time
The minimum simulation time required for reliability assessment with the approach presented
in this work would be approximately the time required for a single run if the number of runs and
the number of cores are equal. However, both the number of runs and the simulation time would
be much higher if the procedure had to be applied to a larger system (e.g., several hundreds of
nodes). The computing times presented in Table 5 correspond to the complete simulation of the
test system during a year; however, as shown in [5], a significant reduction of the simulation time
without affecting reliability index accuracy can be achieved by simulating the system only when
sustained interruptions are caused. Therefore, a significant reduction in simulation time is still possible;
the quantities presented here should be seen as the upper limit of simulation time when reliability
assessment is based on the application of a power flow simulator.
Table 5. Simulation Times—Scenario 3.
Reliability Study Runs 1 core 60 cores
Base case with Distributed Generation 1 run 191 s -
Without Distributed Generation
1 run 5256 s -
360 runs - 38237 s
With Distributed Generation
DG equipment does not fail 1 run 5375 s -
DG equipment can fail 1 run 5427 s -
DG equipment does not fail 420 runs - 45405 s
DG equipment can fail 420 runs - 46154 s
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7. Impact of Distributed Generation on Distribution System Reliability
The main goal of this paper is to propose a procedure that could be used for reliability analysis of
distribution systems with and without DG and considering different levels of automation. The results
presented in Tables 3 and 4 correspond to the study of the test system under certain load and
generation conditions. Therefore, the conclusions derived from those results should be used with
care. Although the differences obtained for load indices are not too significant with and without DG,
the fact is that DG can positively impact reliability even if islanding conditions (i.e., microgrids) are
not allowed. This section is aimed at clarifying how and when this is possible.
First, remember that PV generation can only help during day-time hours when solar radiation
is non-zero; this means that under some operating conditions its impact during that period of the
day can be significant. Second, restrictions in operating conditions have to be considered in order to
determine whether load transfer is possible or not.
Two case studies corresponding to two different failures on the test system with and without PV
generation are analysed below.
Figure 9 illustrates the impact of a three-phase failure in the voltage regulator located between
nodes 743 and 747, see Figure 2. Given the location of the failed component, a load transfer using
the intermediate switch transfer should be considered. However, since the failure occurs at noon of
a January’s day, the presence of PV generators has a significant impact: without these generators,
there would be an overload of the voltage regulator located on the right feeder, and load transfer is not
made. As a consequence, service cannot be restored to all load nodes (about 3 MW of rated power)
and the actual energy not supplied during service interruption reaches a value close to 23 MWh,
see Figure 9.
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A similar case is presented in Figure 10: a one-phase fault occurs early in the morning (when PV 
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A similar case is presented in Figure 10: a one-phase fault occurs early in the morning (when PV
generation is zero) in the line section located between n des 803 and 805, see Figure 2. One more time,
load transfer is not possible due to overlo d of a voltage r gulator. A though he PV generation cannot
initially affect the system operation because the e is no s lar radiation, due t the time required for
repair and service restoration, solar generation becomes more important and can help the load transfer
option, which would only be feasible with the presence of PV generation; see Figure 8.
An obvious conclusion can be derived from these two cases: if the load level was higher than that
assumed in the previous study, the impact of PV generation would have been more significant than
reflected in Tables 3 and 4.
Figure 11 and Table 6 show the reliability indices that result with the initial and the new operating
conditions, in which load profiles have been modified in order to produce a load increment during
day-time hours without increasing load rated powers. Both studies were carried out considering
Scenario 3. Under the new conditions, system reliability becomes more sensitive to PV generation and
those indices related to interruption duration (SAIDI, CAIDI, and AENS) increase. Since PV generation
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can only provide support during day-time hours, PV generation can have a significant impact on
system reliability if system loads are predominantly diurnal.
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Table 6. Comparison of Reliability Indices. Scenario 3: Service is restored to some customers after
reconfiguration—420 runs.
Index
Without DG With DG(DG Equipment Does Not Fail)
With DG
(DG Equipment Can Fail)
Mean Deviation Mean Deviation Mean Deviation
Initial operating conditions
SAIFI (int) 1.173 0.654 1.173 0.654 1.163 0.613
S I I (h/year) 2.654 .316 2.596 1.280 2.587 1.37
CAIDI ( int) 2.861 1.909 2.809 1.896 2.628 1.537
AENS (kWh/year) 8475.2 4631.5 8266.3 4475.9 8186.9 4668.5
SAIFIDG (int) —– —– 1.078 0.697 1.327 0.684
SAIDIDG (h/year) —– —– 1.634 1.571 6.057 5.240
AENP (kWh/year) —– —– 486.3 613.5 1883.8 1908.7
New operating conditions
SAIFI (int) 1.173 0.654 1.173 0.654 1.163 0.613
SAIDI (h/year) 2.970 1.785 2.721 1.418 2.796 1.612
CAIDI (h/int) 3.152 2.203 2.926 2.027 2.803 1.655
AENS (kWh/year) 10281.7 6423.4 9408.7 5378.1 9643.4 6023.5
SAIFIDG (int) —– —– 1.078 0.697 1.327 0.684
SAIDIDG (h/year) —– —– 1.801 1.786 6.344 5.283
AE P (k h/year) —– —– 571.7 701.8 1907.5 1802.7
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8. Discussion
When the service is restored after an outage, the demand is usually greater than before the outage.
This phenomenon, referred to as cold load pickup, can affect the performance of some protective
devices which can misinterpret the new condition as a fault, and initiate the de-energization of an
unfaulted system. The factors that can affect the magnitude and duration of this phenomenon are many:
outage duration, types of connected load, weather, restoration mode, outage causes, the presence of
distributed generation and/or automatic transfer schemes, time of day, and load level. For a detailed
discussion of this phenomenon and the above factors, see [32,33]. The impact of cold load pickup on
reliability studies is usually neglected. Since load variation occurs after service restoration, the impact
should also be quantified on the demanded power from the high voltage system and/or distributed
generators. In addition, one can assume that at the time a new service interruption occurs the impact
on the load level caused by the previous interruption has already disappeared. As mentioned above,
the impact of this phenomenon is higher at the time service is restored since overcurrent conditions
can be generated due to inrush currents; a deep analysis of these conditions is out of the scope of this
work since a different simulation tool (e.g., an EMTP-like tool) would be required.
However, another approach can be applied if it is assumed that the transients caused during
service restoration will not be dangerous for system components, and there will be no misoperation of
protective devices. Under such assumption, the cold load pickup phenomenon can be included by
considering an extended load model; that is, load profiles should be expanded for including the load
variation to be considered at any time of the day in case of interruption, irrespective of its duration
(i.e., momentary or sustained).
9. Conclusions
This paper has presented a procedure based on a Monte Carlo method for reliability assessment
of overhead distribution systems with or without distributed generation using a multicore computing
environment and a power flow simulator running in time-driven mode. This approach offers some
important advantages (see also [5]): (1) the model can be realistic and detailed, and results can be very
accurate; (2) simulation results provide a significant amount of information that can be used for other
purposes (e.g., optimum location of DG units); (3) the information can also be used for estimating
other performance indices than those presented here.
It is evident from the results presented in this paper, that although the use of a multicore
computing environment can reduce the simulation time to approximately that corresponding to
a single run with an adequate number of cores, this could be possible for large systems only when a
much higher number of cores was available.
Although the main goal of the paper is to propose a procedure for reliability analysis, the results
presented here prove that, depending on the operating conditions, distributed generation can improve
the reliability of distribution systems, mainly due to the overload that could occur in a faulted system
without the presence of embedded generation; this is especially important when load transfer between
feeders is possible in the system under study.
The present work has been carried out with a detailed distribution system model but with several
limitations (e.g., PV units inject only active power; DG is not used to control voltages of distribution
system nodes). Future work should be addressed to solve aspects that could be important for an
accurate analysis of the smart grid: a shorter time step should be used to cope with fast variations of
PV generation; PV generation could inject/absorb reactive power; DG could be used to control the
voltage of distribution system nodes; load profiles should be edited to cope with the phenomenon of
the cold load pickup; more detailed models for reliability analysis, mainly for some DG technologies,
could be used; islanding conditions should be allowed by incorporating microgrids to the distribution
system. Note that some of these items imply much more powerful simulation tools.
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